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Approaching Law and Exhausting its (Social) Principles  
Jurisprudence as Social Science in Early 20th-Century China 
Daniel Asen* 
 
The last decade of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and Republican period 
(1912-1949) saw intensive efforts to revise the Qing Code, promulgate modern 
legal codes based on Japanese and German law, establish a modern system of 
courts, and develop a professional corps of lawyers and jurists (Huang 2001; Xu 
2001; Yeung 2003; Young 2004; Neighbors 2004). These institutional reforms 
were implemented as part of the drive to have extraterritoriality rescinded and 
safeguard the sovereignty of the Qing dynasty and then Republic of China.1 The 
reforms were accompanied by new categories within civil and criminal law 
(including a new conceptual distinction between the two), new conceptions of 
legal knowledge and expertise, and rich discussions over sources of law which 
took place within the legal realm as well as the readership of Republican 
newspapers and journals (Young 2004; Lean 2007). If, as Roger Berkowitz (2005, 
1) writes in his study of scientific codification in continental Europe, “in a legal 
system, there must be some way that the law comes to be known,” how did 
ways of knowing law change during this period of legal reform and broader 
intellectual change? Through a survey of jurisprudence textbooks and other legal 
publications, this paper argues that writers in early 20th-century China came to 
define jurisprudence (faxue 法學, falixue 法理學) in positivistic terms, ultimately 
using new conceptions of science (kexue 科學) and social science (shehui kexue 
社會科學) to identify its place within a new ordering of modern knowledge.  
By defining jurisprudence in these ways, the writers of the works that I will 
examine were engaging with formulations of legal knowledge occurring in Japan, 
Europe and the United States. In mid-19th and early 20th-century continental 
Europe, the centuries-old impetus to seek rationalized justifications for law 
(which Berkowitz traces to the late 17th-century natural law of Leibniz) began in 
the Historical jurisprudence of Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861) to take the 
“social life of a people” as the ultimate source of law. This trend, which 
Berkowitz argues was a key factor in the emergence of social scientific 
conceptions of law, culminated in the 1900 German Civil Code, which 
represented “a pure technical means for the pursuit of social, economic, and 
ultimately political ends” (2005, 141). Within this context, the importance of the 
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social in the methodological and philosophical syncretism of late 19th- and early 
20th-century jurisprudence, which Roscoe Pound (1870-1964) would construe as 
presaging Sociological Jurisprudence, demonstrated an epistemologically 
significant shift in jurisprudential inquiry to the social sciences (Pound 1911).2 In 
Meiji Japan (1868-1912)—a site which would become extremely important for 
the conceptualization of modern jurisprudence in China—the drafting and 
implementation of new codes as well as the establishment of modern legal 
education were accompanied by engagement with the various schools of French, 
Anglo-American, and, especially, German jurisprudence (Chen 1907; Takayanagi 
1930, 746-747; Röhl 2005, 23-28).3 In intellectual projects akin to those occurring 
in the early 20th-century works from China that I will examine, Meiji thinkers 
attempted to work out the place of jurisprudence (hôgaku 法學, hôrigaku 法理學) 
in new schemas of modern knowledge. Their classification of jurisprudence as a 
positivistic gaku 學 (science) as well as their creation of a broader social scientific 
vocabulary laid the groundwork in important ways for the discussions of 
jurisprudence that would occur in late Qing and Republican China.4  
It was within this global context that Chinese writers of the first decades of 
the 20th century began to conceptualize jurisprudence in social scientific terms. 
The main sources that I will use to examine this shifting conception of law are 
editions of General Introductions to Jurisprudence (Faxue tonglun 法學通論), a 
name given to many of the introductory legal textbooks which circulated during 
this period. The first section of this paper discusses these circulations of printed 
material and their place in legal education in order to provide context for my 
analysis of the discourses of jurisprudence. The second section focuses on the 
ways that authors of these textbooks used social scientific conceptual 
frameworks organized around the Japanese-derived kexue 科學 (science) to 
define jurisprudence as a category of modern knowledge. It was through this 
new vocabulary that jurisprudence came into being as a distinct field of 
knowledge alongside other disciplines like economics and sociology. While 
writers identified the place of philosophical methods in these positivistic 
conceptions of jurisprudence in different ways, the social (shehui 社會) was a 
consistent concern of jurisprudential inquiry. The third section looks to 
                                                 
2 In early 20th-century America this development drew on an older inductive orientation rooted 
in antebellum Baconian natural theology. See Schweber 1999. 
3 See Wigmore 1897, Takayanagi 1930 and Röhl 2005 for overviews of legal reform in Meiji 
Japan.  
4 The philosopher Nishi Amane 西周 (1829-1897) developed particularly complex formulations of 
the epistemological status of jurisprudence. For example, in his 1870-1871 manuscript 
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sciences (shubetsugaku 殊別學). See Havens 1970, 92-94 as well as Nishi 1945, 183. Also see, 
for example, Inoue Tetsujirô’s 井上哲次郎 (1855-1944) 1884 Kaitei zôho tetsugaku jii 改訂增補
哲學字彙 (Revised and Enlarged Dictionary of Philosophy), which contains many of the words 
that would become essential to modern Chinese discourse on jurisprudence (for example: 
jurisprudence, hôrigaku 法理學; science, rigaku 理學, kagaku 科學; society, shakai 社會).  
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discussions of principles of law (fali 法理) to examine the changes in ways of 
knowing law that these social scientific conceptions of jurisprudence entailed. 
The discussions that took place in textbooks and journals presented these 
principles as inductively knowable, objective social facts that constituted the 
objects of inquiry of the kexue (science) of jurisprudence. As we will see, 
however, several writers productively combined this view of jurisprudential 
knowledge with a much older discourse on principle (li 理) that had been rooted 
in late imperial Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy in order to discuss the ways that principles 
underlying the law reflect ethical considerations.5 In this sense, the case of 
jurisprudence as kexue is suggestive of the complex resonances that scientific 
discourse carried in early 20th-century China (Wang 1997).  
Introductory Textbooks and Legal Education in Early 20th-Century China 
The establishment of jurisprudence as a distinct field of modern knowledge 
did not occur solely at a discursive level. It took place in large part through 
institutional and sociological changes to the ways that knowledge about law 
circulated in early 20th-century China. The establishment of educational 
institutions for the specialized study of law, modern legal professionalization, 
and the work of modern judicial organs in applying and interpreting law 
contributed to restructure the economy of legal knowledge and define a new 
class of legal experts which included judges, prosecutors, and lawyers (Huang 
2001, 44-46). In addition, the explosion of textbooks, specialist journals, and 
other kinds of printed material produced by a burgeoning print capitalism 
supported these new distributions of legal knowledge (Reed 2004). Because it 
was within this context of writing, publishing, and reading that discussions of the 
epistemological status of jurisprudence took place, it is important to consider 
briefly some of the ways that knowledge about jurisprudence was organized and 
made to circulate in early 20th-century China.  
“General introduction to jurisprudence” (Faxue tonglun 法學通論) was a title 
applied to numerous textbooks and courses during this period. It also 
represented a way of organizing the new body of faxue knowledge and as such 
provides an excellent window onto the intertwined institutional and 
epistemological dimensions of the birth of modern jurisprudence in China. The 
earliest course with the title appears to have been taught at the Capital Law 
School (Jingshi falü xuetang 京師法律學堂), which was established by Shen Jiaben 
沈家本 (1840-1913) and Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳 (1842-1922) in October 1906 with 
                                                 
5 While this intellectual movement has been grouped under “Neo-Confucianism,” I follow 
Benjamin Elman in using “Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy” as a more specific term for the particular 
strand of intellectual orthodoxy which informed the late imperial civil service examinations. See 
Elman 2005, xxii. 
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the goal of training the personnel required for legal reform.6 Under the tutelage 
of Chinese and Japanese instructors, students at the Capital Law School 
underwent either a three-year course of study or a one-year crash course. 
Courses included “Qing Code and codes of the Tang and Ming,” “Current legal 
systems and the evolution of historical legal systems,” “General introduction to 
jurisprudence,” and a range of other courses in law, economics, and foreign 
languages. “General introduction to jurisprudence,” which was taught by Okada 
Asatarô 岡田朝太郎 (1868-1936), was part of the first-year curriculum. Ostensibly 
as an adjunct to the school’s instruction, Okada’s lectures were published with a 
1908 preface by Shen Jiaben (Shen 1911?, 2:25).  
In the years after 1912, a number of other institutions for specialized study of 
law were established. A 1923 article by W.W. Blume, dean of the Comparative 
Law School at Soochow University (Dongwu daxue 東吳大學), describes the 
situation at the beginning of the 1920s (Blume 1923). In 1916 there were forty-
nine Chinese “law colleges” which primarily taught German law via Japanese 
translations. According to Blume’s statistics, there were twenty-one public and 
ten private law colleges in 1921. While judicial institutions and legal education in 
Republican China heavily relied on German models, institutions like the 
Comparative Law School, founded in 1915 and managed by American Protestant 
missionaries, maintained connections to American jurisprudence through its 
instructors and students who studied abroad. 7  Where did the “General 
introduction to jurisprudence” fit into early 20th-century legal education? In his 
1935 work Legal Education, Sun Xiaolou 孫曉樓 (Shelley Sun), a Comparative Law 
School graduate, professor and associate dean (Conner 1993, 88), discussed the 
“general introduction” as part of law-school curricula (Sun 1935, 200). 
Extrapolating from a comparison of Anglo-American and continental systems, 
Sun argued that the continental emphasis on starting with the general and only 
later teaching the specific (xian zonglun hou fenlun 先總論後分論) was suitable 
for adoption in China. Sun noted that these courses, along with general 
introductions to criminal and civil law, were the first classes that law students 
took in a continental legal education.  
A survey of works with the title General introduction to jurisprudence in the 
Comprehensive Catalog of Republican Period Books provides another picture—
                                                 
6 The Capital Law School was not the first educational institution in China that taught modern law 
or that had provided introductory instruction in law. For example, by 1895 the Pei-yang 
University at Tientsin (Tianjin zhongxi xuetang 天津中西學堂) had included law in its curriculum. 
See Blume 1923, 305 and Shen and Wang 2005, 377. For more on the Capital Law School see 
Lin 2001 and Shen and Wang 2005, 380. The school was directly administered by Shen and the 
Office for Revision of the Law (Xiuding falüguan 修訂法律館) until 1912, when it was combined 
with the Capital School of Law and Politics (Jingshi fazheng xuetang 京師法政學堂) and School 
of Public Finance (Caizheng xuetang 財政學堂) to form the Beijing Specialized School of Law and 
Politics (Beijing fazheng zhuanmen xuetang 北京法政專門學堂) under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Education. 
7 The Comparative Law School played a major role in Shanghai’s legal realm during the early 
decades of the 20th century. See Conner 1993, 84. 
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albeit limited—of where these introductory materials fit into legal education 
during the 1930s and 1940s (Beijing tushuguan 1986-1996, 5:2-7).8 The following 
institutions had editions with which they were explicitly identified: Chaoyang 
University’s Law Department (1927); Jiangsu Provincial Educational School 
(1931); Military School (Junshi xuexiao 軍事學校), mentioned in its wartime 
political educational materials (1938); and Personnel Training Academy of the 
Capital Police Board (1946).9 Several tentative observations can be drawn from 
the list. First, editions of General introduction… were used as part of school 
curricula in different parts of China and saw use throughout the Republican 
period. Second, editions of General introduction… were used in the instruction of 
law students, government administrators, police, and military personnel. As 
basic introductions to jurisprudence, they served a range of audiences. Besides 
the relatively few editions affiliated with particular educational institutions, 
there were a number published by individuals without institutional affiliation. A 
count of all editions listed in the Comprehensive Catalog reveals that there were 
at least forty-six published between 1907 and 1946.10 Of these titles, nine had 
second editions. One had three editions. Three had four editions. One had five, 
and one had six. Ouyang Xi’s 歐陽谿 (1931) had eleven. Qiu Hanping’s 丘漢平 
(1933) had seven. Lou Tongsun’s 樓桐蓀 (1940) had eight. My analysis below will 
examine exactly what these popular editions had to say about jurisprudence as a 
field of modern knowledge.  
What did these books contain, and, for that matter, what did it mean to call 
something a tonglun 通論 (general introduction)? The 1932 Dictionary of Law, 
Politics and Economics defined tonglun as a “summarizing theory” (gaikuo lilun 
概括理論) pertaining to any kind of matter (Yu 1932, 524). The term itself was 
applied to a range of topics—during the 1920s and 1930s these included 
libraries, municipal government, Buddhist philosophy, museums, and even the 
Tang Code. Within jurisprudence, there could be tonglun for more specific 
bodies of knowledge such as the law on civil procedure.11 The editions of General 
introduction to jurisprudence published during the Republican period dealt with 
a constellation of basic issues in jurisprudence (Li and Wang 1999, 3). Li Long and 
Wang Xigen survey a number of these works and provide an overview of the 
main concerns: objects, scope, and methods of jurisprudence; origins, nature, 
and characteristics of law; relationship between law and other social 
                                                 
8 Of course, editions of Faxue tonglun that are not specifically identified as teaching materials 
could also have served such a role. 
9 There were three entries which did not have dates: that of Hebei Province’s local administrator 
training academy, that of the Politics Department of Zhejiang’s Private Specialized School of 
Law and Politics, and that of Central Police Academy.  
10 I did not count multiple editions of the same book by the same author.  
11 See, for example, the advertisement for works published by graduates of Comparative Law 
School at Soochow University which appeared in Law Magazine (Faxue zazhi 法學雜誌), volume 
5, no. 1. (Oct. 1931).  
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phenomena; sources of law and the types of law; legal relationships and political 
obligations; and uses of law and rule of law. Li and Wang’s survey indicates a 
degree of consistency in the contents of the textbooks; however, as I will show, 
there were variations in the ways that individual writers engaged with these 
concerns.  
Some writers of General introductions to jurisprudence addressed the 
question of the meaning of this format in greater detail. For example, in his 1931 
edition, Ouyang Xi wrote that the “general introduction” is a “subject which is 
necessary preparation for studying jurisprudence” (Ouyang 1931, 2-3). Instead of 
providing solely a discussion of the divisions of knowledge within jurisprudence, 
it provides a systematic overview of the basic knowledge needed for studying 
jurisprudence, including basic questions of “law, country, rights, and 
obligations.” In this sense, General introductions provided the fundamentals that 
were required for more advanced study. Using almost identical language, Lou 
Tongsun made a similar point about rational organization in his 1940 edition 
while also touching on questions about the status of knowledge contained in the 
General introduction and scope of jurisprudence as a field of inquiry (Lou 1953, 
3-7). In a wide-ranging discussion of the meaning of “general introduction to 
jurisprudence,” Lou wrote:  
If knowledge is not systematic it can only be considered to 
be common sense (changshi 常識 ) and not scientific 
knowledge (kexue zhishi 科學知識 ). If all that is known 
about the truth of a matter are its fragments, this can only 
be considered to be general rules (changli 常理) and not 
principles which are common to the entirety (gongtong 
yuanli 共通原理 ). There are many divisions within the 
subject of law. Speaking of them as parts, a given section 
has its own principles and unique circumstances 
surrounding its establishment and evolution. But speaking 
of them in their entirety, within the legislative system of 
one country among every kind of law there are general 
principles (yiban yuanli yuanze 一般原理原則) which link 
them together. 
For Lou, the “general introduction to jurisprudence” as a distinct subject of 
study ubiquitous in both law school curricula and those of less specialized 
educational institutions was “necessary preparation for studying jurisprudence” 
and provided “general, systematic knowledge about national laws and rights and 
duties.” It contained precisely those principles that were common to the entirety 
(gongtong yuanli 共通原理) of jurisprudence. Lou’s passage is significant in a 
number of ways. It demonstrates one definition of scientific knowledge as 
involving systematicity and, as we will see below, as intrinsically related to the 
extent to which inquiry into a particular subject exhausts its scope and the 
principles informing it. In addition, the assertions made by Ouyang and Lou that 
knowledge of background political and social phenomena was necessary 
Asen  Approaching Law and Exhausting its (Social) Principles 219 
 
 
preparation for studying jurisprudence suggest the extent to which a social 
scientific conceptual framework largely translated from Japanese was essential 
for articulation of jurisprudence as a modern discipline. It is the role of this new 
set of concepts in the discursive establishment of jurisprudence as a modern 
field of knowledge to which I now turn. 
Jurisprudence as Social Science 
The establishment of law schools and other educational institutions offering 
modern legal education and the publication of journals and textbooks 
consolidated the institutional position of jurisprudence in early 20th-century 
China. Occurring at the same time was a fundamental restructuring of the 
possibilities of even talking about jurisprudence as a distinct body of knowledge. 
While the reforms of the early 20th century both encountered and grew out of a 
highly sophisticated body of legal codes, institutions, and what might be called 
jurisprudential knowledge, it was only during this period that jurisprudence as a 
category of modern learning came into being. This section examines the ways 
that early 20th-century writers used new conceptual frameworks to establish 
jurisprudence as this distinct field of knowledge. Through the designation of 
jurisprudence as a “science” (kexue 科學) as well as use of other “return graphic 
loans”—classical Chinese compounds which were given new, modern meanings 
by Japanese translators during the late 19th century (Liu 1995, 302)—writers 
began to conceptualize jurisprudence within the framework of a positivistic 
ordering of knowledge. In these schemas, jurisprudence existed on par with 
other disciplines like economics and political science in its claim to certain 
knowledge of a particular domain of human activity. That early 20th-century 
writers of textbooks and other works on law placed jurisprudence within this 
epistemology shows the extent to which the social sciences were becoming a 
crucial medium through which law would come to be known in Republican China 
and throughout the 20th century.  
The word kexue (science) was introduced into Chinese from the Japanese 
kagaku 科學 , which first appeared in Meiji Japan during the early 1870s 
(Reardon-Anderson 1991, 86). Japanese writers (and subsequently Chinese 
writers) used this term as well as the word gaku 學 (science) to create a unified, 
positivistic ordering of natural and social knowledge.
12
 As will become apparent 
in my discussion of principles of law below, early 20th-century Chinese writers 
viewed inductive analysis as the essential means of knowing the laws of society. 
While kexue was an important means of organizing modern knowledge, a much 
older discourse rooted in late imperial intellectual orthodoxy appeared within 
these discussions in interesting ways. This was the discourse of “investigating 
                                                 
12 See Wang 1997, 35-37 and Havens 1970, 92-111 for discussion of the term gaku in Nishi 
Amane’s writings.  
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things to extend knowledge” (gewu zhizhi 格物致知)—an empirical method for 
developing knowledge of the moral principles inherent in the particularities of 
the world and, ultimately, bringing about the moral cultivation of the knowing 
subject. As part of the methodology of Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy, this 
epistemological orientation played an important role in late imperial intellectual 
life. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the vocabulary of the 
“investigation of things” was used in scientific translations, albeit without the 
positivistic origins and classificatory goals of kexue. After 1915, the more recent 
kexue came to encompass all senses of “science” as “intellectual paradigm, a 
method of acquiring knowledge, and a group of disciplines whose purpose was 
to explain physical reality” (Reardon-Anderson 1991, 88).  
In late Qing and Republican editions of General introduction to jurisprudence, 
kexue (science) was integral to claims that jurisprudence was a distinct field 
within a broader ordering of modern knowledge. We might begin by examining 
Chen Jingdi’s 陳敬弟 1907 General Introduction, which had been dictated from 
the Japanese legal scholar Ume Kenjirô 梅謙次郎 and his lectures at Hosei 
University (Hôsei daigaku 法政大学). Chen dealt with questions of epistemology 
in the chapter “Is law (falü 法律) a science or an art?” (Chen 1907, 25-27). 
Beginning with definitions of science (xue  學 or kexue 科學) and art (shu 術), 
Chen wrote that Japanese scholars define science as “studying in order to know 
the truth of a matter (or matters with a particular scope).”13 Implicit in the 
definition is the circumscribed nature of the object of study and the specialized 
nature of the field. Thus, he wrote that “all of the sciences of the present era 
exist as different fields (fenke 分科).” In this way, engaging in a science means 
“specializing in one’s affairs.” In contrast to sciences, an art is a method used to 
attain a particular goal. Ultimately, law can be either a science or art depending 
on the kinds of knowledge produced and the goals of study. Chen wrote that 
law, or jurisprudence, is a science when the object of study is the principles of 
law (fali 法理 ) of a particular society and, specifically, “how law maintains the 
needs of society” as well as how it evolves and develops. Thus, jurisprudence 
was a science because it dealt with this circumscribed body of knowledge. 
That Chen Jingdi defined jurisprudence by means of the social (shehui 社會) is 
indicative of the ways that study of law was being conceptualized in social 
scientific terms in early 20th-century China (Chen 1907, 1). In the textbooks that 
this paper surveys, jurisprudence is consistently located within the scope of this 
new category. For example, the very first sentence of Qiu Hanping’s 1933 edition 
established that the following discussion of law was to take place within this 
particularly modern conceptual framework: “Looking at the phenomena of the 
universe from the point at which they arise, they can be divided into two classes: 
natural phenomena and social phenomena” (Qiu 1933, 1-3). In this schema, legal 
phenomena were essential features of social life. If science (kexue) was an 
important classificatory element through which jurisprudence was delineated as 
                                                 
13 See Havens 1970, 95 for Nishi’s early distinction between science (gaku 學) and art (jutsu 術) as 
“between knowledge and application.”  
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a distinct discipline in early 20th-century China, “nature” (ziran 自然) and 
“society” (shehui 社會) were also crucial for this conception of the location of 
jurisprudence in, to borrow David Reynold’s (1991) metaphor, a reordered 
“intellectual map.” While both compounds appear in classical sources prior to 
the 20th century, they became “return graphic loans” when Japanese translators 
used them for modern conceptions of “nature” and “society” (Liu 1995, 326 and 
336). As Michael Tsin argues, shehui (society), as a “discursive premise of 
modern government” accompanied by attempts to mobilize and order the 
populace, was a new form of political organization in early 20th-century China 
(Tsin 1999, 6). These discourses and, by extension, the intellectual frame in 
which jurisprudence was located were thus quite new.  
Lou Tongsun’s 1940 General Introduction provides another example of the 
ways that this modern epistemological framework was used to delineate 
jurisprudence as a distinct body of social scientific knowledge during the 
Republican period. As we saw in Lou’s discussion of the “general introduction,” 
Lou considered systematic organization to be an indication of scientificity. His 
definition of learning (xuewen 學問) as possessing “systematic knowledge of all 
of the phenomena and principles pertaining to each given thing” is also 
indicative of this view of epistemological authority (Lou 1953, 2). In this 
definition and, more generally, Lou’s discussion of the relationship between 
jurisprudence and the other social sciences (shehui kexue 社會科學), his main 
point was that individual sciences were distinct entities because of their claim to 
authoritative knowledge of particular areas. While Lou argued that jurisprudence 
was fundamental to the social sciences just as mathematics forms the 
foundation of the natural sciences (“for a modern, civilized person to have 
abandoned the law means that there is no way to continue existing within 
society”) (Lou 1953, 6), he emphasized that the “status” (diwei 地位) of 
jurisprudence among the other sciences was not a question of importance 
(zhongyaoxing 重要性) but rather of division of labour (fen’gong 分工): because 
modern learning is so broad, it is more important to understand where 
jurisprudence sits in relation to the system of learning (xuewen xitong 學問系統) 
of modern knowledge than it is to make absolute distinctions (Lou 1953, 19). For 
this reason, when studying jurisprudence it is imperative to “know in advance in 
which section of the system of learning jurisprudence stands. Once the borders 
are clear, it will be easier to apply oneself to study.”  
Lou visually represented the status of jurisprudence by means of a chart 
showing the branches of learning (xue 學) (Lou 1953, 20; see figure 1 and my 
translation in figure 2). After dividing learning into science and philosophy, Lou 
further distinguished between the formal sciences (xingshi kexue 形式科學) and 
substantive sciences (shizhi kexue 實質科學). The substantive sciences were 
further divided into natural sciences and social sciences. Lou located 
jurisprudence (falüxue 法律學) under the social sciences. Lou’s discussion and 
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visual representation of modern knowledge posits a kind of equivalence 
between sciences (kexue 科學) like jurisprudence, political science, sociology, and 
economics in the sense that all are legitimate fields of knowledge that claim 
jurisdiction over particular areas of learning. As we will see below, Lou’s 
assumption was that jurisprudence also took inductive analysis of society’s 
objective principles of law as its method of inquiry. While the institutional status 
of jurisprudence in relation to other social sciences in early 20th-century China is 
a story that is beyond the scope of this paper,14 the important point for our 
purposes is that a positivistic epistemology anchored in a host of new words 
from Japan—key among them kexue—was being used to locate the modern 
discipline of jurisprudence within a new intellectual landscape. It was alongside 
the institutional work of reform and professionalization that these discourses on 
knowledge shaped the possibilities for jurisprudence to be a discipline within a 
framework of other disciplines. 
While Lou considered jurisprudence to be a “science” (kexue 科學) within the 
broader ordering of modern knowledge, turning to the composition of 
jurisprudence itself he acknowledged that contemporary jurists had found 
myriad ways to classify the internal contents of this field of study (Lou 1953, 21-
23). Relying on “usual opinion” (tongchang de jianjie 通常的見解), Lou divided 
jurisprudence into three branches: philosophy of law (falü zhexue 法律哲學 or 
falixue 法理學),15 legal science (falü kexue 法律科學), and legal history (falü shixue 
法律史學). These branches were represented in a chart (see figure 3 and my 
translation in figure 4). According to Lou, philosophy of law involved “seeking the 
[most] fundamental, common, and highest principles pertaining to any kind of 
law in its entirety.” As such, philosophical inquiry into law involved “transcending 
the limits of time and space” to examine the ways that law arises, develops, and 
changes and the cause-and-effect relations which inform these developments. 
Legal science (falü kexue 法律科學) referred to the organization of the current 
legal system of one country, as suggested by the branches (constitutional law, 
civil law, criminal law) displayed on Lou’s chart. Finally, legal history was itself a 
                                                 
14 Sun Chung-hsing’s study of the social sciences in pre-1949 China suggests some of the ways 
that jurisprudence was established as a social science in institutional arrangements. See, for 
example, Sun’s (1987, 116) discussion of the founding of Academia Sinica in 1927. Alongside 
ethnology, sociology, and economics, jurisprudence comprised one of the four sections of the 
Institute of Social Science.  
15 Wei Hua, whose work I will discuss below, translated falixue 法理學 as “jurisprudence” and 
considered it to be a science (kexue) which was different from philosophy of law (falü zhexue 法
律哲學). The 1936 Anglo-Chinese Law Dictionary (Huaying shuangjie fazheng cidian 華英雙解法
政辭典) (Zhang 1936, 429-430) glossed “jurisprudence” as “The phylosophy (sic) of law, or the 
science which treats of the principles of positive law and legal relations.” It provided the words 
falixue and falü zhexue as Chinese translations. The next page in the dictionary listed 
“Jurisprudentia” as a separate entry, with “Jurisprudence, or legal science” as the definition 
(with Chinese words falixue and falüxue 法律學 as translations). The fact that falixue was listed 
as a translation for both terms suggests some of the ambiguities which might have surrounded 
this word.  
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“science” (kexue 科學) that studied the “course of evolution” (yan’ge jingguo 沿
革經過) of the legal doctrines and institutions of a single country.  
That Lou considered the kexue (science) of jurisprudence to contain a 
philosophical (or metaphysical) component would not have been unusual in 
contemporary European and American jurisprudential discourse. Early 20th-
century jurisprudence was becoming increasingly syncretic, as exemplified in 
Roscoe Pound’s own formulation of Sociological Jurisprudence (Pound 1911, 
592).16 The philosophical component that Lou described also would not have 
been incompatible with his classification of jurisprudence as a social science 
given that by the early 20th century, “society” and social interests had become 
key considerations in ethical and philosophical discussions of law (Pound 1911, 
615; Berkowitz 2005). Lou’s description of the internal categories of 
jurisprudence was not the only way of conceptualizing the role of philosophical 
inquiry in this field of knowledge in early 20th century China. We find a different 
formulation of these boundaries in Wei Hua’s 维华 1931 article in Nanjing 
University Weekly (Nanda zhoukan 南大周刊 ). Wei wrote explicitly that 
jurisprudence was neither an art nor a philosophy, but a science (kexue 科學) 
that studied the principles of law (Wei [1931] 2003, 218). Wei explained that the 
difference between philosophy of law (falü zhexue 法律哲學) and the science of 
jurisprudence (falixue 法理學) was the questions that were asked:  
Philosophy of law is the field of learning (xuewen 學問) 
which uses the methods of philosophy to study the basic 
principles (genben yuanze 根本原則), basic institutions and 
spirit of law and to critique their value… That which 
jurisprudence studies are questions pertaining to “what it 
is” (shi shenme 是什麼) whereas that which philosophy of 
law studies are questions pertaining to “why”(weishenme 
為什麼). That which can be known in jurisprudential inquiry 
are things like what kinds of legal institutions have 
countries of the world—ancient and modern, Chinese and 
foreign—used and according to what kinds of principles of 
law (fali 法理) [have they operated]. Philosophy of law 
studies in more depth what influence particular kinds of 
legal institutions have had on human happiness, society, 
                                                 
16 Also see the work of Edwin Borchard (1912, 25), who included the metaphysical alongside the 
historical, analytical, and comparative in his discussion of the methods used in contemporary 
jurisprudence: “Method is an essential characteristic of every science. Methods applied to legal 
science have gained recognition as they have proved of practical utility in producing a 
symmetrical system of law suitable to the needs of the people whose social relations it has to 
regulate. The four methods principally employed in legal science have been the metaphysical, 
or a priori, the historical, the analytical, and the comparative, each of which has had illustrious 
representatives.”  
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and  culture  (renlei xingfu shehui wenhua 人類幸福社會文
化). Has it impeded its development or encouraged its 
progress? Like this one can know whether or not any kind 
of legal institutions are sound and plan methods for 
attempting to improve them (Wei [1931] 2003, 219). 
For Wei, questions surrounding the value of particular legal doctrines and 
institutions fell under the domain of philosophy of law, whereas questions of 
“what” had actually existed belonged to the domain of jurisprudence—itself 
informed by legal history and comparative law. While Lou Tongsun and Wei Hua 
divided up jurisprudential inquiry in different ways (as did their European and 
American contemporaries), several basic similarities are important for the 
epistemological problems that are at the heart of this paper. It was through a 
common vocabulary of modern terms such as science (kexue科學), philosophy 
(zhexue哲學), and society (shehui社會) that Lou and Wei discussed knowledge 
of law and the disciplinary boundaries of jurisprudence. In this sense, the two 
writers shared a new way of talking about law as modern knowledge—both in 
terms of the placement of the study of law in broader orderings of knowledge as 
well as the social-scientific modes of inquiry used to produce certain knowledge 
of legal phenomena. As I will discuss below with regard to conceptions of 
principles of law (fali 法理), it was social facts—gathered through historical and 
comparative study—that served as the basis for knowledge of law and related 
phenomena.  
Principles of Law  
Beginning in the first decade of the 20th century with the late Qing Xinzheng 
reforms and continuing through the judicial activities of Republican 
governments, Chinese jurists, reformers, and litigants faced the problem of 
reconciling sources of law drawn from abroad with “traditions and usages” 
within China (Young 2004, 136). During the codification projects of the last 
decade of the Qing dynasty, this question became salient within the context of 
discussions over the decriminalization of sex out of wedlock. As Alison Sau-Chu 
Yeung (2003) shows, this debate was so explosive precisely because it 
highlighted the extent to which new legal norms, adopted in order to make Qing 
law compatible with that of other countries, might challenge existing social and 
cultural institutions such as the family. These questions remained just as pointed 
throughout the early Republican period. As Mary Buck Young (2004) shows in 
her study of the Supreme Court’s handling of civil appeals, differences in 
conceptions of corporateness in the former Qing Code and the Japanese (and 
German) inspired reform codes directly affected the interests of debtors and 
lenders. Litigants and jurists drew on a range of sources of law to argue their 
positions in court. These included custom as well as the principles that informed 
the foreign-derived Draft Civil Code, which had been completed by the end of 
the Qing dynasty, but was never put into force (Young 2004, 159).  




Figure 1 From: Lou Tongsun, General Introduction to Jurisprudence (1940, 20) 
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Figure 3 From: Lou Tongsun, General Introduction to Jurisprudence (1940, 22) 
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This section focuses on Republican-era writings on fali 法理, or “principles of 
law,” which constituted a source of law in these deliberations. Young writes that 
the term fali denoted principles with the greatest possible degree of universal 
(indeed, global) applicability and, as such, could be found in the Draft Civil Code 
and elsewhere (Young 2004, 118; Escarra 1936, 126). While my own survey of 
early 20th-century legal textbooks finds that these principles could be construed 
to be so universal as to pertain to the legal activities of humanity as a whole, 
textbooks such as that of Qiu Hanping acknowledge the conflicts that could exist 
between principles so generalized as to be universal and those linked to the 
particular conditions of individual countries. Thus, jurists who drew from 
principles of law were limited by the imperative that they not “turn their backs 
on national sentiment and custom” (Qiu 1933, 34).  
The exact nature and role of “principles” in contemporary continental and 
Anglo-American jurisprudence were points of contention among the various 
schools.17 As we saw in my discussion of the ways that early 20th-century writers 
delineated the boundaries of jurisprudence and philosophy of law, fali (principles 
of law) as well as more generalized “principles” (i.e. yuanze 原則) played various 
roles in different conceptions of jurisprudential inquiry. The important point for 
the purposes of this paper is that discussion of fali in early 20th-century legal 
textbooks and other publications was another site at which knowledge of law 
was being conceptualized in social scientific terms. For example, Qiu Hanping 
defined “principles of law” as principles pertaining to the conduct which is 
necessary in social life (1933, 34): “There are two sources for these principles. 
One is the concrete laws of social life, such as being filial to one’s parents, 
respecting one’s elders, and being kind to the young—China’s innate social rules. 
The other is society’s conception of justice, such as ‘curbing the strong and 
helping the weak’ or ‘equal treatment.’”18 In Qiu’s formulation, principles that 
could serve as sources of law were social norms or conceptions of justice rooted 
in society. Principles of law thus mediated the relationship between social values 
and the rules of a legal system. 
As Howard Schweber (1999, 449) has shown, early 20th-century American 
jurisprudence inherited a view of law and its principles as knowable through 
                                                 
17 For example, see Pound’s (1911, 599) summary of the differences between use of principles in 
philosophical and historical jurisprudence: “The philosophical jurist conceives that a principle of 
justice and right is found and expressed in a rule; the historical jurist, that a principle of human 
action or of social action is found by human experience and is gradually developed into and 
expressed as a rule.”  
18 Qiu’s definition is almost identical to that found in the 1932 Dictionary of Law, Politics, and 
Economics: “Principles of law (falü zhi yuanli 法律之原理). The conduct which can be inferred to 
be necessary in social intercourse. For example, serving one’s parents with filiality, nurturing 
children with love, as well as all [norms] which must be observed.” Yu 1932, 284. 
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inductive reasoning.19 Writers in Republican China shared the basic view that 
social life has rules, standards, or principles that can be objectively sought out 
from particularities. This was a point made by Qiu, who wrote that the social 
followed knowable rules (guize 規則) or standards (guifan 規範), just as nature 
does (Qiu 1933, 2). It was these socially and historically embedded principles of 
law that constituted the object of jurisprudential inquiry (Qiu 1933, 34). Wei 
Hua, whose distinction between jurisprudence and philosophy of law has already 
been discussed, also wrote that after obtaining data from comparative law and 
legal history, those engaged in the science of jurisprudence “seek out the 
principles which govern human legal behaviour” (Wei [1931] 2003, 218). Once 
known, these principles can be evaluated from the perspective of philosophy of 
law.  
While the search for the principles underlying social life certainly befit 
jurisprudence as a positivistic kexue (science), some early 20th-century writers 
explicitly linked their conception of modern principles of law to the empirical 
methods and epistemology of Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy. In this way, the use of 
principles in this new, social-scientific way of knowing the law also involved the 
refiguring of an older discourse on knowledge in which “principle” was a key 
epistemological element. At the heart of the matter was the character li 理 
(principle), which was part of the compound fali 法理 (principles of law). In the 
writings of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), for example, li was part of his attempt to 
establish a philosophical system which could tie Confucian social relationships to 
a broader cosmology. Principle was “the origin of the universe and the 
noumenon of the supreme ethical and moral principle” (Wang 1997, 25). These 
principles, as Wang Hui writes, were knowable in part through the empirical 
enterprise of “probing thoroughly the principle” (qiongli 窮理), which necessarily 
took the “nature and rules of concrete things” as its objects. In Zhu’s writings, 
human beings and the universe were an “integrated whole” girded by these 
fundamentally normative principles which were distinct from the “material 
embodiment” (qi 氣) of the universe (Wycoff 1975, 92-105). Principles as well as 
the human enterprise of studying them (gewu zhizhi 格物致知, of which “probing 
thoroughly the principle” was a crucial component) were both manifestations of 
this transcendent moral order.  
The moral implications of this conception of principle for law had been 
addressed in late imperial China long before fali 法理 became the “principles of 
law” of modern jurisprudence. Eugenia Lean (2007, 93) has described this 
discourse as “the long-standing configuration that had posited human sentiment 
                                                 
19 Also see, for example, Corbin 1954, 162. Corbin’s discussion of legal principles can be 
productively analyzed in comparison with a piece by Heldon Gueck which appeared in a 1933 
issue of Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Glueck promoted 
methodological overlap between jurisprudence and social scientific disciplines. According to 
Glueck, jurisprudence could be methodologically scientific by either making use of these 
scientific disciplines (for example, by using crime surveys) or by adopting a social-scientific 
methodology itself. Both writers share the assumption that society can be studied empirically 
and, crucially, that legal principles are derived from this data. 
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(qing 情) as the moral core of the general principles of the universe (li 理), which, 
in turn, formed the basis of the codified regulations of the body politic (fa 法)”—
a configuration which 20th-century legal reformers challenged. Lean shows that 
while there were diverse opinions on the role of sentiment in legal decision-
making during the Nanjing decade (1927-1937), legal reformers did consider 
sentiment to be in opposition to the rational rule of law (fa 法) and were wary of 
its use in adjudication (Lean 2007, 93-98). In the context of these 
contemporaneous debates over the role of sentiment in adjudication, it is 
perhaps not surprising that assertions about the relevance of sentiment 
appeared within discussions of modern principles of law (fali 法理) in the 
literature on jurisprudence. In the remainder of this section, I will examine the 
ways that two writers who took part in these debates productively combined 
this older discourse of principle with the social-scientific epistemology that I 
have been arguing played an important role in establishing jurisprudence as a 
field of modern knowledge.  
We find the first example in a 1922 issue of Gaizao 改造 (Transformation) in 
which Wu Jixiong 吳繼熊 argued that standards (biaozhun 標準) could serve as 
the spiritual (or moral) sciences’ (jingshen jie kexue 精神界科學) equivalent to the 
formulas and immutable laws of the natural sciences. These standards were the 
principles (li 理) that serve as the ethical expectations underlying the law (Wu 
[1922] 2003, 29). Wu went on to assert the intrinsic relationship between li 理 
(principle) and qing 情 (sentiment), arguing ultimately for the relevance of the 
idea that “the kingly Way is none other than human sentiment” (wangdao 
buwaihu renqing 王道不外乎人情) (Wu [1922] 2003, 30). Wu’s invocation of the 
relationship between principle, sentiment, and law (which originally belonged to 
a way of conceptualizing knowledge completely different from that of kexue) 
was not incompatible with the assertion that the methods of jurisprudence were 
scientific. Indeed, the connections that Wu posits between the methods of the 
natural and social sciences is one of the most interesting features of this text.20 
We find comparable discussions of methodological overlap between the natural 
and social sciences in early 20th-century American jurisprudential discourse,21 as 
                                                 
20 Wu made explicit analogies between the methods of law, a spiritual science, and those of 
natural and formal sciences such as algebra, geometry, physics and chemistry: “The methods of 
studying jurisprudence and studying other kinds of sciences are the same. Having first 
thoroughly comprehended the basic principles, other minor problems can be pondered without 
difficulty and easily solved” (Wu [1922] 2003, 28).  
21 For example, Glueck (1933, 110) viewed the modern evolution of jurisprudence as involving a 
shift from being based on “some theory involving supernatural, transcendental, or other 
dogmatic authority” to one informed by Pound’s Sociological Jurisprudence, which investigates 
“the physiology as well as the anatomy and histology of law as a social institution and an 
instrument of social control.” Compare Glueck’s use of biological metaphors with Taylor’s 
(1909, 243): “In the masterly demonstration that followed [Sir Henry Summer Maine, an 
adherent of the Historical School] showed that legal ideas and institutions have a real course of 
development as much as the genera and species of living creatures; that they cannot be 
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well as in contemporary writings from China. 22  By couching discussion of 
sentiment-based principles (li 理) within the positivistic epistemology of the 
natural and social sciences, Wu was working within the bounds of contemporary 
tendencies to consider socially and historically grounded “public sentiment and 
opinion” as elements in legal decision-making (Pound 1911, 600). 
In his popular 1940 General Introduction to Jurisprudence, Lou Tongsun also 
used a set of classical concepts and allusions to convey that principles of law in 
modern jurisprudence were commensurable with the older category of principle. 
Lou began his chapter on principles of law by writing that “(the statement that) 
the ‘ten-thousand things are none other than principle’ is similar to the ancients’ 
saying that ‘the kingly Way is none other than human sentiment (wangdao 
buwaihu renqing 王道不外乎人情),’” thus equating principle and sentiment (Lou 
1953, 58).23 If there were no laws or customs on which to base a legal decision, 
one could use the seeking of sentiment and deliberating on principle (zhenqing 
zhuoli 斟情酌理) as the standard of legal decision-making. In Lou’s discussion, 
sentiment as the basis of principle was compatible with modern jurisprudential 
discourse on socially grounded principles of law: “All things rely on an idea of 
society’s axioms and justice (shehui gongli zhengyi de guannian 社會公理正義的觀
念). If one carefully analyzes them, one will be able to discover a kind of 
objective, distinguishable natural principle (keguande shifei quzhide ziran tiaoli 
客觀的是非曲直的自然條理).” Lou concluded this segment of the section by 
claiming that this conception of principles of law was actually what “China’s 
ancient sages” meant when they talked about “extending knowledge by 
investigating things” (zhizhi gewu 致知格物) and “approaching things and probing 
thoroughly their principles” (jiwu qiongli 即物窮理). Lou thus combined the 
Cheng-Zhu category of principle with a social-scientific view of law framed with 
modern conceptions of society (shehui 社會) and objectivity (keguan 客觀). As in 
the case of Wu Jixiong, this discourse on moral principles productively 
supplemented the modern conception of principles of law.  
                                                                                                                                     
treated as mere incidents in the general history of the societies where they occur. The works of 
these epoch-making men- the one German, the other English- have resulted in the creation of 
what may be called the natural history of law.” While Glueck acknowledged that “there is a 
certain naiveté among recent writers in the social sciences who speak glibly about applying the 
technique of the test tube and the microscope to problems that are as complex as are human 
behavior and motivation, and the shifting sands of social transformation,” he wrote ultimately 
that the “methodology of ‘pure science’” is not inapplicable to the social sciences, of which 
jurisprudence was one (Glueck 1933, 117-8). 
22 For a more circumscribed discussion of the methodological parallels between the natural and 
social sciences, see John C.H. Wu’s (Wu Jingxiong 吳經熊) piece in a 1926 issue of The China 
Law Review. Wu argued that the natural sciences and law can share methods such as analogy 
and hypothesis; however, the goals of these methods differ based on fundamental differences 
between the two classes of sciences.  
23 Zhu Zuyi’s 朱祖貽 General Introduction, which was first published in 1944, began its chapter on 
principles of law with a variant of this phrase: “The ten thousand things are none other than 
principle. Law must certainly have legal principles” (Zhu 1946, 24).  
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How are we to view the hybrid discourses surrounding principles of law that 
appeared in the writings of Wu Jixiong and Lou Tongsun? As part of an effort to 
establish jurisprudence as social-scientific knowledge, these writers were 
participating in what was fundamentally a universalizing project. As in the case 
of all authors whom I have discussed, they were engaging with contemporary 
jurisprudential discourse of other countries. Yet, if late Qing and Republican legal 
reform was one more example of the negotiation of “global universals” that 
were occurring in myriad “translated and contested moments in colonial and 
cultural encounters in which the translator… is a central agent” (Liu 1999, 128), 
we might consider these discussions of principles of law to be a prime example 
of the negotiated character of jurisprudential knowledge in modern China. 
Indeed, the classical allusions that both authors used strongly suggest that in 
early 20th-century China, the modern compound fali could have “excess 
signification” (Liu 1999, 152) in the direction of the older discourse of li 理 as 
moral principles. The complex meanings surrounding this term and the traces of 
semantic transformation that they represent demonstrate the contingency and, 
implicitly, the politics of the historical process through which the vocabulary of 
modern jurisprudence gained authority.  
Conclusion 
This paper has examined some of the ways that modern jurisprudence was 
both a site and product of epistemological transformation in late Qing and 
Republican China. My argument has been two-fold. First, I have argued that 
jurisprudence as a category of modern learning was established in part through 
its placement in a social scientific ordering of knowledge for which kexue 科學 
(science) was a key element. Second, I have argued that early 20th-century 
writers conceptualized principles of law (fali 法理)—sources of law and objects of 
jurisprudential inquiry—in positivistic terms as objective social facts. I have also 
shown that in some cases these principles were discussed in terms of both the 
social-scientific epistemology appropriate to a kexue as well as a discourse 
informed by Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy for which principle was a fundamental 
element of knowing, albeit in a different way. By refiguring legal knowledge 
within this new conceptual framework, these discourses of jurisprudence also 
implicitly naturalized the modern nation as well as the newly established 
category of jurisprudence (faxue 法學) itself as crucial subjects of history.24 It is in 
this sense, and in the newfound association between law and science, that these 
changes in conceptions of legal knowledge can be viewed as important elements 
of the modernity of legal reform in 20th-century China.  
 
 
                                                 
24 See Ruskola 2002 for more on this point.  
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